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Franks (Kenneth) v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 1 (Jan. 3, 2019)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: EVIDENCE, PRIOR BAD ACTS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court reviewed whether a district court’s decision to allow the State to introduce prior 
incidents of uncharged sexual acts as evidence of the defendant’s propensity for committing sexual 
offenses violated NRS 48.045(3) and concluded such evidence as long as it is first evaluated for 
relevance and its heightened risk of unfair prejudice.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
On September 18, 2015, the defendant was charged with lewdness with a child under the 
age of fourteen. The defendant’s niece alleged that in June 2015, he pulled down her pants and 
rubbed her genitals while they were wrestling and tickling.  
During the State’s questioning of the defendant’s niece, she testified of four other instances 
where the defendant had touched her inappropriately. The district court did not hold a hearing 
regarding whether such testimony was admissible and the defendant did not object to the 
testimony. 
The jury found the defendant guilty of the charged offense, and he was sentenced to ten 
years to life in prison. This appeal followed.  
 
Discussion 
 
The district court did not plainly err by permitting the State to introduce evidence of Franks’ prior 
acts that constitute separate offenses for purposes of showing propensity under NRS 48.045(3) 
 
 Standard of review 
 
The Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo, and “when a statute is 
clear on its face, a court cannot go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent.”2 If a 
defendant fails to object to a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence in the lower 
court, appellate review is precluded unless it rises to the level of plain error.3 Reversal for plain 
error is only warranted if the error was prejudicial to the defendant’s substantial rights.4 
 
Statutory Interpretation of NRS 48.045(3) 
 
NRS 48.045(3) went into effect on October 1, 2015. Despite the fact that the claim against 
the defendant was filed on September 18, 2015, his trial did not commence until November 28, 
2016. Therefore, NRS 48.045(3) applied to his case. 
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 The plain language of NRS 48.045(3) states that “[n]othing in this section shall be 
construed to prohibit the admission of evidence in a criminal prosecution for a sexual offense that 
a person committed another crime, wrong or act that constitutes a separate sexual offense,” and 
allows for the admission of evidence of prior sexual bad acts “to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that the person acted in conformity” with the alleged sexual offense.5  
 Because the statute’s language is unambiguous, the Court determined that district courts 
are permitted to admit prior sexual bad acts for propensity purposes in a criminal prosecution for 
a sexual offense.  
 
Application of NRS 48.045(3) 
 
 To ensure that criminal defendants are not “convict[ed] for crimes other than those 
charged . . . because a bad person deserves punishment,” the Court created a standard for what 
evidence is admissible in a criminal sexual conduct.6 
 To introduce evidence of a defendant’s prior bad sexual act: (1) the State must request the 
district court’s permission to introduce the evidence of the prior sexual offense for propensity 
purposes outside the presence of the jury and explain how the prior sexual offenses are relevant to 
the charged offense; (2) the district court must make a preliminary finding that the prior sexual 
offense is relevant for propensity purposes and that a jury could reasonably find by  a 
preponderance of the evidence that the bad act constituting a sexual offense occurred; and (3) the 
district court must weigh the risk of prejudicing the defendants case against the value of the 
evidence for propensity purposes. 
 Regarding the third requirement, the Court named several factors for the district court to 
consider including the: (1) similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged, (2) the closeness in time 
of the prior acts charged, (3) frequency of the prior acts, (4) the presence or lack of intervening 
circumstances, and (5) necessity of the evidence beyond the testimonies already offered at trial.7   
 Here, the defendant was not substantially prejudiced when the district court allowed the 
admission of evidence of his past bad sexual acts, despite the fact that the district court did not 
follow the aforementioned safeguards because the evidence satisfies the listed factors. The 
defendant was charged with lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen, and the evidence 
being contested was testimony of the defendants’ sexual conduct was identical to the crime he was 
charged with and involved the same child. 
 Furthermore, even though the testimony of the additional sexual acts may not have been 
necessary to the State’s case, “evidence need not be absolutely necessary to the prosecution’s case 
in order to be introduced; it must simply be helpful or practically necessary.”8 
 
Sufficient evidence supporting Frank’s conviction 
 
 The Court upheld the defendant’s conviction because, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, it found that a rational trier of fact could have found the 
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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the function of the Court to 
“assess the weight of the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.”9 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court concluded that the district court did not commit plain error by allowing the State 
to introduce evidence of the defendant’s past sexual acts for propensity purposes. Moreover, the 
Court found there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction. Thus, the Court 
upheld the district court’s decision.   
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